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Abstract 
It still remains unclear whether the decision to outsource IT is governed by rule of efficiency or 
from institutional constraints imposed by the state and the professions in order to gain legitimacy 
through institutional isomorphism. Our analysis is based on a unique data set that contains all 
first-time decisions of publicly listed German firms to engage in large-scale IT outsourcing 
between 1990 and 2008. We find that both motives play a role for IT outsourcing decisions. Firms 
are more likely to make a first-time decision for IT outsourcing when they have a considerable low 
cost efficiency, a low ratio of cash to liabilities, and low earnings per share. Also a firm is more 
likely to sign an IT outsourcing contract if successful and large peers have already made the same 
decision. We find that firms with a low cost efficiency are likely to choose IT outsourcing contracts 
with duration of more than five years while firm with low earnings per share tend to engage in 
short-term contracts. Consequently, economic reasons as well as institutional factors have to be 
kept in mind when analyzing large-scale IT outsourcing decisions. Studies that focus only on one of 
these motives without acknowledging the other may omit important factors. 
Keywords: IT Outsourcing, Efficiency, Institutional Isomorphism, Legitimacy 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, many authors looked into the reasons that compel businesses to change 
their structure through IT outsourcing (Grimshaw and Miozzo,2006), Hall and Liedtka,2005). In 
spite of these numerous analyses, it still remains unclear whether the decision to outsource IT is 
governed by rule of efficiency or from institutional constraints imposed by the state and the 
professions in order to gain legitimacy through institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell,1983). Efficiency variables such as a low net income or a heightened cash demand of the 
outsourcing firm as well as institutional factors such as mimetic or normative pressure can be in a 
conflicting as well as a congruent relationship regarding the question of IT outsourcing. 
Up until now, only four articles study efficiency and legitimacy oriented influence factors in their 
combined effect on IT outsourcing decisions (Ang and Cummings,1997, Barthélemy and 
Geyer,2004, Vitharana and Dharwadkar, 2007). These articles conclude that both factors are 
important for decision making and reveal that the exclusive observation of economic factors 
without recognizing institutional effects is insufficient and vice-versa.  
However, these studies are restricted to a comparison of organizational fields such as the 
comparison of two countries (Germany and Great-Britain for instance) or the distinction of political 
vs. private economic environment. An integrated observation of economic and institutional 
influence factors so far mostly relied on the comparison of institutional contexts; at best, it 
identified moderating factors between an economical and an institutional entity. In former works 
the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable was determined mostly through 
the pair wise comparison with the mean value of a control group. The added value of the following 
article therefore lies in the equal value attributed to efficiency and legitimacy without determining a 
priori a main effect and a secondary effect. Against this background, this paper contributes to the 
integration of the economic and institutional perspective.  
The goal of the paper is to determine whether economic and legitimacy-oriented behaviour can be 
reconciled or whether these factors are mutually exclusive. We examine this question with a unique 
data set that contains all first-time decisions of publicly listed German firms to engage in large-
scale IT outsourcing between 1990 and 2008. As IT outsourcing was hardly known among German 
firms prior to 1990, our sample provides a quasi-natural experiment that helps us to identify the 
type and strength of economic and legitimacy-oriented pressures on IT outsourcing decisions. 
2 Theory  
2.1 Efficiency oriented influence factors on IT outsourcing decisions 
2.1.1  Cost efficiency 
A first factor identified as a significant reason for IT outsourcing by senior management is the cost 
cutting potential (Lacity and Wilcocks, 1995). This is often reflected in the company goals at the 
time of the contract conclusion. Smith et al. (1998), for instance, determine in their study that 26 of 
29 outsourcing companies were following a company-wide cost cutting program mentioned in their 
annual report at the time of the contract conclusion.  
Performance problems are seen as an important incentive to change the status quo and initiate 
organizational change (Millar and Chen, 1994). Firms which show a low cost efficiency in 
comparison to other companies and take this as an incentive to force a change therefore seem 
predestined for IT outsourcing (Smith et al., 1998). This is in accordance with the assessment of 
Strassmann (1995), that outsourcing is a “game for losers“ in which mainly unprofitable companies 
participate. From this results the following hypothesis: 
(H1) Companies with a low cost efficiency show a tendency towards IT outsourcing. 
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2.1.2 Cash demand and liabilities 
Next to the effect on cost efficiency, outsourcing of IT operations to an external service provider 
also has an effect on the cash balance. The customer can expect a short term “cash infusion“ at the 
beginning of the contract duration (Barthélemy and Geyer, 2004). During the take-over of 
operations by the service provider, the customer sells PCs, servers, and network equipment, while 
in return the cash supply rises. This exchange leads to a reduction of assets, i.e. working capital and 
a simultaneous increase in cash. Often, even higher sums than the residual book value of the 
transferred assets are being paid (Juma’h and Wood, 1999), especially when personnel are being 
transferred, so that an added payment instrument materializes for the customer (Hall and Liedtka, 
2005). The rules of accounting allow for these profits to be shown as operating income, as they do 
not have to be declared as a result from “discontinued operations“. Therefore, a short term cost 
effect can arise at the beginning of the contractual period next to the cash effect, so that from the 
point of view of investors, the customer’s company performance is enhanced (Hall and Liedtka, 
2005). Next to this, a short term cash effect is achieved for the customer if the IT service provider 
grants generous payment terms when invoicing for services. 
Companies with low cash reserves have a clear motive to close deals which generate a high inflow 
of cash short term (Juma’h and Wood, 1999). These findings lead to the following hypothesis: 
(H2a) Companies with need for cash show a tendency towards IT outsourcing. 
As shown, customers exchange assets for cash. This can be used to reduce liabilities (Smith et al., 
1998). However, some authors are of the opinion that the connected intent to reduce future payback 
obligations is idealistic, as service providers get a reimbursement through leasing rates and service 
fees in exchange (Hall and Liedtka, 2005). The underlying construct hereby resembles a “sale and 
lease back“ or rental agreement (Juma’h and Wood, 1999). Taking a closer look at the financial 
construct, these concerns cannot be shared. Service providers usually receive favourable financing 
conditions for leasing compared to the credit conditions of their customers, as the lessor applies the 
solvency of the IT service provider. If a financially strong IT service provider is chosen, the IT 
provider will have lower interest terms through better credit ratings. Therefore cost savings can be 
achieved in addition to the positive cash effect through financing instead of investment. This cost 
effect might appear marginal. However, considering the balance sheet, the difference between 
financing through loan versus leasing is significant. While loans are appear as a liability on the 
balance sheet, this is generally not the case for leasing obligations that are integral part of service 
fees. Applying this leasing construct, neither are the respective fixed assets shown on the balance 
sheet nor does their financing appear as a liability, so that IT outsourcing is sometimes considered 
an “off balance sheet“-financing (Juma’h and Wood, 1999). Summing up, the financial 
expenditures and liabilities are considerably and sustainably reduced for the customer. Logically 
consistent, debt reduction was named as motive for IT outsourcing in about 50 % of annual 
financial statements of outsourcing companies (Smith et al., 1998). Companies with a high debt 
ratio can benefit greatly this way, as the reduction of liabilities makes them appear less risky and 
thus a better credit rating reduces the financing costs for their loans (Hall and Liedtka, 2005). 
Hence, 
(H2b) Companies with a high degree of debt show a tendency towards IT outsourcing 
2.1.3 Shareholder expectations 
The factors we pictured so far, i.e. cost efficiency, cash requirements and debt show an internal 
perspective on performance. This reflects the shareholder’s point of view only partially. The 
shareholders of a corporation mostly act as investors and therefore take the position of the market – 
a perspective more external to the company. They analyse business progress discerning, as they 
have a legitimate interest in its positive development. When shareholders are unhappy with a 
company’s performance, they put pressure on the managers, who in turn try to portray their 
company in a better light. Managers hereby show a tendency to take decisions with short term 
effects to fulfil their investors’ expectations and maximise their profit. 
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IT outsourcing projects usually lead to an increase in the company value. Similarly, former studies 
have shown that the markets have a predominantly positive reaction to outsourcing agreements 
(Hayes et al., 2000). Moreover, IT outsourcing improves financial performance in the view of 
external stakeholders, as already pointed out above. Therefore companies that are forced to 
enhance their shareholders’ performance can use outsourcing as an effective mean to achieve just 
that. These findings lead to the following hypothesis: 
(H3) Companies which do not fulfill their shareholder’s expectation show a tendency 
towards IT outsourcing. 
2.2 Legitimacy of IT outsourcing decisions 
Mimetic pressures (imitation) play a role particularly with environmental insecurities or the 
complexity of a decisive situation (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992b). Decision takers are geared to 
known, trustworthy models for imitation. These are mostly companies which are highly visible and 
appear modern or successful – the company that seems best or most efficient in the perception of 
the copying company. Intermediaries for the necessary information to imitate another company can 
be employees who switched companies and brought knowledge about another company, but also 
consulting firms active in several companies of a sector (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Moreover, 
company networks which are created for instance through membership in sector-specific 
associations, committees or unions can function as sources for mimetic behaviour (Ang and 
Cummings, 1997). The more broadly a company is positioned, the more possibilities it has to learn 
from others, to imitate and copy them (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
In summary, companies that have not practiced IT outsourcing until now and are uncertain in their 
decision making process rely on the first-hand accounts of the management of other companies and 
follow their path. The basis for an imitation of IT outsourcing behaviour can also be a similarity to 
other companies of the same sector with similar suppliers and clients or large and successful 
companies (Vitharana and Dharwadkar, 2007). 
Normative pressure is the logical consequence of „structuring“ forces which result in homogenous 
or isomorphic behaviour and thereby influence the behaviour of companies (Heugens and Lander, 
2009). The development of normative pressure originates in cognitive processes resulting from 
habits taken for granted (Vitharana and Dharwadkar, 2007). With the increasing forming of the 
company environment norms and standards take on definite forms which limits the organizational 
activity. 
In their decision making process, managers consider norms and standards which are considered 
mandatory in their business or field. The business practices in their environment are subject to a 
routine or are held as accepted solution for certain problems. Therefore some management 
decisions appear obvious or self-evident from the start. A search for possible alternative solutions 
is dispensed with. 
This can also concern an IT outsourcing decision, for instance when the outsourcing of IT 
operations has asserted itself in a sector with certain standards and counts as up to date, without 
being critically scrutinized anymore. If a company observes that competitors outsource their IT 
department and that IT outsourcing asserts itself in its environment, it will show a similar 
outsourcing behaviour to gain legitimacy with their clients and business partner (Vitharana and 
Dharwadkar, 2007). In doing so, transaction costs can be saved by calling on service providers that 
are already established as well as adapting prevalent contract standards, monitoring techniques and 
sanction mechanisms. Hence, 
(H4a) „Mimetic pressures“ lead to the imitation of large and successful companies and 
(H4b) the existence of „normative pressures“ leads to the imitation of companies in the 
same industry. 
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2.3 Choice of contract duration 
2.3.1 Contract duration and efficiency 
The economic criteria cost efficiency, cash requirements and debt as well as dividend yield are 
influenced – as shown – short term as well as long term through IT outsourcing. A closer look 
however allows a distinction on the basis of the above-mentioned arguments between the influence 
of the efficiency criteria on short term and on long term contract duration. 
Generally, the consequences of cost efficiency are more long term in nature. If a contract runs five 
years on average this corresponds roughly to 15% of the outsourced IT budget for a year. On top of 
this, in the first year there are expenditures for the transfer of the IT operation to the service 
provider, so that in spite of the attractive remuneration models described above, the reduction of 
the cost of IT operations arrives for the employer with a delay. Similarly, cost savings from process 
ameliorations and automation can hardly be realized short term, as they become effective only after 
completion of the transformation by the service provider. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
(H5a) Companies with a low cost efficiency decide for IT outsourcing with long contract 
duration.  
The prospect of a fast inflow of cash through the sale of fixed assets in the beginning of the 
contract duration constitutes an important part of the outsourcing decision for the employer. 
Simultaneously, granted credit periods take effect on the cash flow at the beginning of the contract 
period. Moreover the IT outsourcing has a long term influence on the cash and debt situation, as 
investment – and therefore the financing of the fixed assets – in the IT sector are carried out for the 
whole of the contract run by the IT service provider. And the reduced costs of the IT operations 
have a lasting positive influence on the cash resources. This leads to the following thesis: 
(H5b) Companies with cash demand and high debt do not have fixed contract durations for 
their IT outsourcing projects. They choose short as well as long contract periods. 
Reports on contractually arranged outsourcing projects are received mostly positively by market 
participants (Hayes et al., 2000). They heighten the company value short term. The often necessary 
restructuring of the company on the grounds of IT outsourcing however has more negative long 
term effects on the company value. The shareholders’ expectations can therefore be fulfilled 
through short term contract periods while simultaneously reducing the risk of becoming dependant 
on IT providers that would accompany a long term contractual obligation. Therefore there is no 
motive for the employer to accept long term contract periods when concluding IT outsourcing 
agreement in response to pressure form the shareholders. Moreover, contract with shorter duration 
can be negotiated faster as they have to take fewer precautions to provide for unforeseen situations, 
for instance with regards to technological change, price development in the IT sector, fluctuating 
demand or unclear requests from the employer. In this way, the requirements of the shareholders 
can be taken up faster, so that they prefer shorter periods as well. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
(H5c) IT outsourcing contracts which were concluded because of weak performance from 
the perspective of shareholders have shorter contract duration. 
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2.3.2 Contract duration and legitimacy 
The outsourcing of the data processing does not only have positive consequences, but also risks and 
insecurities, for instance with regard to the price development for IT services or technological 
change (Lacity and Willcocks, 1995). Companies which see high risks in the outsourcing decision 
will have a tendency not to obligate themselves for a long time and to therefore choose a short 
contract period. Employers act carefully and try to conclude contracts as detailed and complete as 
possible or to find arrangements which will keep the hurdles to a reversal of the outsourcing 
minimal. They therefore use contractual means and configuration possibilities to reduce the 
„locked-in”. 
The uncertainty is particularly strong when companies outsource for the first time. Employers in 
these situations will try to compensate their uncertainty by emulating large and successful 
companies or adapting established practices in their sector to legitimize their decision. Hence, 
(H6) Institutional factors influence IT outsourcing decision independently of the chosen 
contract duration. 
3 Data and Methods 
3.1   Variables 
Dependent variable 
We examined the first-time decisions of publicly listed German firms to engage in large-scale IT 
outsourcing between 1990 and 2008. To get a complete sample of firms, we searched for respective 
outsourcing announcements in the Lexis Nexis data base as well as in relevant IT journals using 
search terms like „IT“, „DP“, „data processing“, „data center“ etc. The announcements were 
compared with two databases that comprise all IT outsourcing contracts with a volume over € 1 
Mio (PAC Deal Tracker) and over € 10 Mio (Sourcing Monitor). In addition, we asked a number of 
experienced IT sales managers and IT consultants to assess whether we had captured all relevant IT 
outsourcing projects and to point out potential missing data. This exhaustive data collection effort 
resulted in a sample of 1.041 IT outsourcing contracts with a volume over € 1 Mio for 19 year 
time-window between 1990 and 2008. To verify our data, we checked for IT outsourcing decisions 
in the years prior to 1990 and did not find any relevant announcements. As IT outsourcing was very 
uncommon among German firms before 1990, we are confident to have a complete data set of first-
time IT outsourcing decisions. In addition, we avoid problems with left-censoring. 
The question whether a strategic choice – like IT outsourcing – aims at increasing efficiency or 
legitimacy is especially relevant when the firm has no prior experience with that decision and faces 
high uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Therefore, we focused on a firm’s first-time 
decision to engage in large-scale IT outsourcing. We treated an IT outsourcing decision as a first-
time decision if the firm had not chosen to engage in IT outsourcing with a volume over € 1 Mio 
before. In case of a holding company, a first-time outsourcing decision refers to the first-time large-
scale IT outsourcing contract of any of the firm’s subsidiaries. After one of the subsidiaries had 
decided to engage in IT outsourcing, later contracts of other subsidiaries were not included in the 
study. This resulted in a sample of 627 first-time IT outsourcing contracts. 
To match our data on IT outsourcing with reliable information on various measures of firm 
performance, we had to narrow down our sample to publicly listed firms. These firms represent a 
broad spectrum of the German economy, with the largest firm equivalent to a firm in the top 5 of 
the Fortune 500 and the smallest firm falling in the range of smaller mid-cap firms in the U.S., 
allowing us to observe a great deal of variance in firm size within the sample. Our final data set 
consists of 227 first-time IT outsourcing decisions of publicly listed firms in Germany for a 19 year 
time-window between 1990 and 2008. Consequently, our dependent variable, IT outsourcing jt, is 
coded as 1 if firm j became party to an IT outsourcing contract over € 1 Mio in year t.  
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Independent variables 
We use a number of independent variables to capture whether an IT outsourcing decision was 
driven by a firm’s quest for efficiency or for legitimacy. All independent variables are lagged by 
one year. 
Our first independent variable, cost efficiency, is measured as the relation of net income and total 
assets. Cost efficiency serves as indicator for a firm‘s productivity and accounts for taxes that 
accrue when parts of the firm’s assets are sold to an IT service provider and for potential balance 
sheet contractions (Hall and Liedtka, 2005). Additional indicators for a firm’s efficiency are its 
cash demand and debt. Both measures are affected by IT outsourcing in the same way. As a firm 
outsources large parts of its IT, it exchanges investments in IT assets against monthly service fees 
to the outsourcing provider, thus reducing the amount of tied capital. Furthermore, a sale of current 
IT assets to an outsourcing provider results in a cash infusion. As a consequence, the outsourcing 
firm can meet a higher cash demand and reduce its debt. Prior studies often use both measures 
separately without accounting for their correlation. Analyzing H2a and H2b, we aim at integrating 
the effects of IT outsourcing on meeting cash demand and reducing debt by using a combined 
variable, i.e. the relation of cash to liabilities. 
A firm’s quest for an increase in efficiency may not only be driven by an internal performance 
perspective but also by shareholders’ expectations. To capture the effect that IT outsourcing may 
be driven by a firm’s wish to better meet these expectations, we use earnings per share. Extant 
literature has shown that this measure has an influence on IT outsourcing decisions.  
Many studies that analyze mimetic behavior measure in how far a firm’s specific choice or action is 
affected by similar decisions of other organizations in their sample (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 
Haunschild and Miner, 1997). This set-up, however, makes it difficult to distinguish between 
mimetic behavior and a general diffusion of strategic choices and actions. To get a more fine-
grained measure for legitimacy-oriented behavior, we analyze the firm’s propensity to imitate IT 
outsourcing decisions of large and successful firms. As these firms are especially visible and 
prominent, they may be seen as role models by their smaller and less successful peers (Burnes and 
Wholey, 1993; Haveman, 1993). Our indicator for size is the firm‘s log number of employees while 
success is measured as the relation of net income and total assets. Firms in the top quartile of the 
respective indicator are identified as especially large and/or successful. The impact of these firms‘ 
IT outsourcing decisions on our sample firms are captured by two variables labeled size imitation 
and success imitation. The variable industry imitation captures the number of firms within an 
industry in our sample that have already chosen to engage in large-scale IT outsourcing. The 
industries are defined according to the classification provided by Datastream. To be able to 
compare coefficients across models we standardized the variables for size imitation, success 
imitation, and industry imitation. 
Moderator 
A measure for contract duration serves as moderating variable. Contract duration is a dichotomous 
variable that helps us to distinguish between IT outsourcing contracts that last up to 4 year on the 
one hand and longer than 5 years on the other hand.  
Control variables 
In all models we control for firm size, measured as the log of employees. To control for unobserved 
industry effects, we create dummy variables for five of the six broad industry categories 
represented in our study. Finally, we control for the duration of the IT outsourcing contract 
(contract duration), except in those models that analyze the moderating effect of this variable.  
3.2   Analysis 
To analyze the effects of our independent variables on IT outsourcing decisions we estimate a 
piece-wise logistic regression model which is a simple extension of a discrete-time logit 
specification with piecewise constant hazard rates. The advantage of a piece-wise regression model 
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is that it does not make strict assumptions about the effect of time on the likelihood of IT 
outsourcing. Rather, a constant baseline hazard rate is assumed for each time period that is allowed 
to vary between the „time pieces“ (Petersen, 1995). We chose five year periods as respective 
cutpoints or „time pieces“ (i.e. 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004; 2005-2008). 
Each year (beginning in 1990) represents a spell in which firms may potentially become party to an 
IT outsourcing contract. If a firm did not engage in IT outsourcing throughout the observation 
period, the spell was right censored by the end of 2008. Spells were updated at the end of each year 
to accommodate the annual time-varying covariates. Once a firm had opted for a large-scale IT 
outsourcing contract, the next year’s risk set was diminished by the respective firm. This yielded a 
total of 2.730 firm-year spells. We accounted for the correlation between decisions about IT 
outsourcing by the same firm across different years by using a robust variance estimator (Lin & 
Wei, 1989).  
4 Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Please note the considerably strong 
correlation between the three variables that capture the impact of imitation on IT outsourcing 
decisions (i.e. size imitation, success imitation, and industry imitation). These correlations could be 
an indicator of problems with multicollinearity. Since multicollinearity inflates standard errors, the 
respective correlations would work against our predictions. To address this issue, we entered the 
respective variables in separate models.  
 
1 
 2
 
3 C
4
 
5
6
 7
8
 9
 11 
 13 S
 14 Indus
  Mean Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
IT Outsourcing .847 .963              
 Firm size 9.953 1.762 0.065             
ontract duration .841 .365 0.102 0.036            
 Industry 1 .132 .339 0.014 0.111  0.027           
 Industry 2 .273 .446 0,090 0,082 0,104 -0,239          
 Industry 3 .220 .414 -0,039 0,025 -0,089 -0,207 -0,326         
 Industry 4 .110 .313 -0,036 -0,064 -0,078 -0,137 -0,216 -0,187        
 Industry 5 .114 .318 -0,034 -0,059 0,043 -0,140 -0,221 -0,191 -0,127       
 Cost eff iciency .028 .119 -0,022 0,114 -0,039 0,076 -0,053 0,111 -0,038 -0,044      
10 Cash / Liability .140 .337 -0,029 -0,211 -0,067 -0,062 -0,057 0,011 0,026 0,204 -0,019     
Earnings per Share .057 .178 0,060 0,077 -0,071 0,010 0,001 0,033 -0,052 -0,002 0,038 -0,026    
12 Success imitation .784 1.495 0,665 0,031 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,020 0,032 0,119   
ize Imitation .669 1.280 0,666 0,028 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,032 0,037 0,107 0,973  
try Imitation .760 1.407 0,684 0,054 0,017 0,022 0,133 -0,058 -0,053 -0,050 -0,025 0,015 0,108 0,971 0,968
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 provides the results of our main analyses. Consistent with the logistic transformation of the 
dependent variable, the coefficients represent the effect of each variable on the log-odds of IT 
outsourcing. Model 1 reports the findings for the control variables. The dummies for the time 
pieces are significant and reveal that the likelihood of IT outsourcing increases over time. Firm size 
and contract duration have a positive and significant influence on IT outsourcing. The dummies for 
the broad industry categories are insignificant with the exception of the category „construction, 
manufacturing system engineering, and electrical industry“ (i.e. Industry 2 in Model 1).  
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
 b (se)  b (se)  b (se)  b (se)  b (se)  
-4,480 *** -4,659*** -4,146 *** -4,233 *** -4,185 ***Time piece 1 
(1990-1994) (0,430)   (0,626)   (0,655)  (0,686)  (0,662)   
-3,593 *** -3,879*** -3,810 *** -3,897 *** -3,877 ***Time piece 2 
(1995-1999) (0,416)   (0,623)   (0,634)  (0,636)  (0,642)   
-2,928 *** -3,300*** -4,066 *** -3,955 *** -3,792 ***Time piece 3 
(2000-2004) (0,397)   (0,606)   (0,638)  (0,681)  (0,668)   
-1,802 *** -2,087*** -3,703 *** -3,301 *** -3,126 ***Time piece 4 
(2005-2009) (0,378)   (0,570)   (0,698)  (0,773)  (0,738)   
0,057 * 0,085* 0,093 * 0,090 * 0,090 * Firm Size (0,035)   (0,050)   (0,051)  (0,051)   (0,052)  
0,307 * 0,185   0,138   0,173   0,161   Contract duration (0,142)   (0,173)   (0,179)   (0,178)   (0,176)   
0,044   0,284   0,243  0,269   0,176  Industry 1 (0,209)   (0,280)   (0,284)  (0,285)   (0,283)  
0,342 * 0,687** 0,698 ** 0,704 ** 0,470 * Industry 2 (0,170)   (0,252)   (0,253)  (0,256)   (0,266)  
-0,060   0,334   0,283  0,317   0,345 + Industry 3 (0,177)   (0,261)   (0,265)  (0,266)   (0,264)  
0,234   0,321   0,256  0,302   0,357  Industry 4 (0,238)   (0,344)   (0,342)  (0,350)   (0,347)  
-0,020   0,296   0,238  0,281   0,314  Industry 5 (0,195)   (0,287)   (0,301)  (0,296)   (0,300)  
    -2,303*** -2,407 *** -2,254 *** -2,242 ***Cost Efficiency     (0,644)   (0,686)   (0,651)   (0,664)   
    -0,843* -0,848 * -0,851 * -0,835 * Cash / Liabilities 
    (0,450)   (0,460)   (0,459)   (0,457)   
    -0,354* -0,485 * -0,394 * -0,453 * Earnings per Share     (0,204) (0,243)   (0,226)   (0,241)   
       0,644 ***      Success Imitation        (0,150)        
          0,519 *    Size Imitation           (0,234)      
            0,457 ** Industry Imitation             (0,181)   
N 2.178   1.519   1.519  1.519   1.519  
Wald ² 1.391,26 *** 1.165,27*** 1.007,68 *** 1.078,79 *** 1.100,41 ***
+ p < 10%     * p < 5%     ** p <1%     *** p < 0,1% (two-tailed tests)  
Table 2.  Impact of Efficiency and legitimacy rationales on IT outsourcing Piece-wise 
logistic regression; robust standard errors in parenthesis 
In Model 2 we include the three variables that capture efficiency as trigger for IT outsourcing 
decisions. Our measures for cost efficiency, cash/liabilities, and earnings per share show a 
significant and negative influence on IT outsourcing. Put differently, firms are more likely to make 
a first-time decision for IT outsourcing when they have a considerable low cost efficiency, a low 
ratio of cash to liabilities, and low earnings per share. Thus, we find support for Hypotheses 1, 
2a/b, and 3.  
We tested Hypotheses 4a and 4b by assessing the impact of prior IT outsourcing decisions of 
successful and large peers on the focal firm’s decision to follow suit. As Model 3a and 3b in Table 
2 reveal, both variables show a strong and significant positive influence on the focal firm’s IT 
outsourcing decision. Consequently, a firm is more likely to close an IT outsourcing contract if 
successful and large peers have already made the same decision. Model 3c reveals the results for 
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the influence of prior IT outsourcing decisions of peers within the industry on the focal firm. In line 
with Hypothesis 4c, we find a significant and positive result.  
So far, our results for Hypotheses 1 through 4 show that IT outsourcing decisions may be triggered 
by a quest for efficiency and/or legitimacy. This also confirms our baseline assumption that both 
motives play a role for IT outsourcing decisions.  
 
 Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c 
 Short-term contract Long-term contract 
 b (se)   b (se)   b (se)   b (se)  b (se)  b (se)   
-18,067 *** -17,409 *** -16,623 *** -3,984 *** -4,089 *** -4,016***Time piece 1 
(1990-1994) (1,621)  (1,675)  (1,683)  (0,697)  (0,726)  (0,704) * 
-1,898  -1,903  -1,225  -3,609 *** -3,660 *** -3,650***Time piece 2 
(1995-1999) (1,611)  (1,644)  (1,624)  (0,690)  (0,691)  (0,705)  
-1,520  -1,632  -0,918  -3,966 *** -3,754 *** -3,675***Time piece 3 
(2000-2004) (1,545)  (1,567)  (1,491)  (0,699)  (0,765)  (0,742)  
-1,530  -1,534  -1,308  -3,517 *** -2,966 *** -2,920***Time piece 4 
(2005-2009) (1,735)  (1,711)  (1,650)  (0,782)  (0,896)  (0,825)  
-0,056  -0,059  -0,106  0,084 + 0,081 + 0,081+ Firm Size (0,133)  (0,133)  (0,131)  (0,058)  (0,058)  (0,059)  
-1,868 * -1,890 ** -2,681 *** 0,407 + 0,426 + 0,347  Industry 1 (0,819)  (0,731)  (0,814)  (0,300)  (0,299)  (0,299)  
-0,555  -0,811  -2,159 * 0,791 ** 0,795 ** 0,600* Industry 2 (0,811)  (0,845)  (0,948)  (0,263)  (0,264)  (0,279)  
-0,973 ** -1,228 ** -1,214 ** 0,356  0,396 + 0,413+ Industry 3 (0,415)  (0,500)  (0,409)  (0,285)  (0,282)  (0,280)  
-1,960 *** -2,091 *** -2,269 *** 0,638 + 0,692 * 0,725* Industry 4 (0,497)  (0,475)  (0,531)  (0,401)  (0,415)  (0,408)  
-2,548 *** -2,557 *** -3,022 *** 0,419 + 0,451 + 0,483+ Industry 5 (0,497)  (0,547)  (0,487)  (0,306)  (0,302)  (0,306)  
-3,322  -1,990  -3,455  -2,379 *** -2,294 *** -2,243***Cost Efficiency (3,166)  (3,044)  (3,038)  (0,721)  (0,694)  (0,700)  
-0,234  -0,235  -0,218  -0,791 + -0,809 + -0,779+ Cash / Liabilities (0,467)  (0,497)  (0,442)  (0,508)  (0,511)  (0,509)  
-1.190 * -0.908 + -1.237 * -0.430   -0.387   -0.422   Earnings per Share (0.588)   (0.602)   (0.573)   (0.416)   (0.384)   (0.410)   
1.261 ***   0.586 ***    Success Imitation (0.277)    (0.179)     
  1.393 ***   0.408 +  Size Imitation   (0.366)    (0.279)   
   1.793 ***    0.394* Industry Imitation    (0.385)     (0.202)  
N 294  294  294  1.225  1.225   1.225  
Wald ² 8.370,80 *** 8.139,55*** 6.142,77 *** 918,28 *** 962,54 *** 976,95***
 + p < 10%     * p < 5%     ** p <1%     *** p < 0,1% (two-tailed tests) 
Table 3.  Efficiency and legitimacy rationales under varying levels of contract duration 
Piece-wise logistic regression; robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Table 3 reveals the results for the moderating influence of contract duration on the impact of an 
efficiency rationale and institutional factors on IT outsourcing. As scholars have recently shown, 
conventional interactions may lead to inappropriate conclusions in non-linear models, like those 
reported here, because the coefficient of an interaction term does not always represent the correct 
sign or magnitude (Ai and Norton, 2003). Consequently, we tested the interaction hypotheses using 
the procedure suggested by Shaver (2007). Specifically, we split the sample into firms with IT 
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outsourcing contract duration below four years (Model 4a – 4c) and above five years (Model 5a – 
5c) and compared the effects across subsamples through a test of significance. Please recall that we 
expect different moderating effects for the duration of the IT outsourcing contract depending on the 
motive that triggered the outsourcing decision. In H5a, we expect that firms with a low cost 
efficiency profit most from long-term IT outsourcing contracts. In line with this prediction we find 
that firms with a low cost efficiency are likely to choose IT outsourcing contracts with a duration of 
more than five years while we find no significant result for short-term contracts. A Wald test 
confirms this result. 
H5b predicted that firms in need of cash or with high debt are likely to engage in short-term as well 
as in long-term IT outsourcing. In contrast to our assumptions, the ratio for cash to liabilities shows 
no significant impact on short-term IT outsourcing contracts and is only marginally significant for 
contracts with a duration over 5 years. In line with H5c, Models 4a to 5c reveal that firms with low 
earnings per share have a strong propensity to enter short-term IT outsourcing contracts while they 
are considerably less interested in respective long-term IT outsourcing. 
With respect to the influence of institutional factors on IT outsourcing we expected to find a 
positive impact of prior outsourcing decisions by successful and large peers as well as by 
competitors within the focal firm’s industry. As Models 4a – 5c show, the direction and 
significance of the coefficients for the variables success imitation, size imitation, and industry 
imitation are as expected. As confirmed by Wald tests, however, the effects were stronger for short-
term IT outsourcing contracts than for long-term contracts.  
5 Discussion 
The results of this study reveal that IT outsourcing decisions may be triggered by economic and 
institutional factors alike. As assumed in our baseline proposition, key strategic decision makers 
seek both, an increase in efficiency and in legitimacy, as they opt to close an IT outsourcing 
contract. Consequently, economic reasons as well as institutional factors have to be kept in mind 
when analyzing large-scale IT outsourcing decisions. Studies that focus only on one of these 
motives without acknowledging its alternative may omit important factors.  
Especially firms that seek to increase their cost efficiency have a higher probability to close long-
term IT outsourcing contracts. As the positive cost effects of IT outsourcing are rather long-term in 
nature, firms with a low cost efficiency profit more from engaging in respective long-term 
contracts. In contrast, firms with a weak capital market performance are more likely to engage in 
short-term IT outsourcing. These firms seem to be more interested in providing a positive signal to 
their shareholders than to realize long-term cost-effects from a respective IT outsourcing contract.  
For both types of contracts we find intra-industry imitation as well as an imitation of large and 
successful peers. However, the effect is much stronger for the split-sample with short-term 
contracts than for the split-sample with long-term contracts. This result is surprising, as long-term 
outsourcing contracts are deemed as especially risky and should, thus, make imitation especially 
likely. A possible explanation for this finding is provided by our control for the four “time-pieces”. 
While all “time-pieces” are significant in the split-sample comprising short-term contracts, all 
“time-pieces” are significant for the split-sample addressing long-term contracts. This indicates, 
that short-term contracts were especially likely in early years (1990-1994) in which the uncertainty 
surrounding the outsourcing decision was especially high.  
As every empirical study, our paper has some limitations which mostly refer to our data set. 
Although we were careful about how to design our sample and invested time in an exhaustive data 
collection effort, our sample suffers from the omission of data. First, as we needed to match our 
data with firms’ financial information, we had to focus on publicly listed firms. Second, it may well 
be that press announcements regarding IT outsourcing decisions are biased towards large and more 
visible firms. Therefore, our results may not be generalizable to privately-owned and smaller firms. 
A further limitation of this study is the fact that other than economic and institutional factors may 
drive IT outsourcing decisions. For instance, these decisions could be driven by firm-specific needs 
that also influence the performance variables under study. We tried to control for that by lagging all 
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independent and control variables but cannot rule out that we may have omitted relevant influence 
factors. Future research may try to provide a more fine-grained picture of the IT-outsourcing 
decision by including additional factors. 
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